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 WHO COULD IT BE NOW? CHALLENGING 
THE RELIABILITY OF FIRST TIME IN-
COURT IDENTIFICATIONS AFTER STATE 
V. HENDERSON AND STATE V. LAWSON 
ALIZA B. KAPLAN* & JANIS C. PURACAL** 
     Despite the recent advances in assessing the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, the focus to date has largely been identifications made 
pretrial.  Little has been written about identifications made for the first time 
in the courtroom.  While in-court identifications have an extraordinarily 
powerful effect on juries, all such identifications are potentially vulnerable 
to post-event memory distortion and decay. Absent an identification 
procedure that effectively tests the witness’s memory, it is impossible to know 
if the witness’s identification of the defendant is a product of his or her 
original memory or a product of the extraordinarily suggestive 
circumstances created by the in-court identification procedure.  In this 
article, the authors discuss the science related to memory and perception and 
how the courts have historically addressed claims of suggestiveness in the 
context of eyewitness identifications and, specifically, how they have handled 
first time in-court identifications. They analyze the issue of first time, in-court 
identifications under the new legal frameworks established by the Oregon 
Supreme Court in State v. Lawson (2012) and the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in State v. Henderson (2011), which both recognize 30 years of science 
proving that memories are malleable and easily influenced by outside forces. 
They argue that, in all states, first time, in-court identifications should be 
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inadmissible, forcing the state to conduct a reliable out-of-court 
identification, whether pretrial or with leave during trial. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, a woman identified John Jerome White as the intruder who 
broke into her home in Georgia and raped and robbed her while she was 
asleep on the couch.1 After White served more than twelve years in prison 
for rape, assault, burglary, and robbery, DNA evidence conclusively proved 
that the victim identified the wrong man. The DNA proved that, not only was 
White not the rapist, another man, James Parham, was the actual perpetrator. 
The victim identified White even though Parham, the man who actually 
 
1 John Jerome White, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content 
/Johncases-false-imprisonment/john-jerome-white (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).    
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attacked her, was present in the live lineup. 
In 1995, four victims identified Patrick Waller as the man who robbed 
them, tied them up, and sexually assaulted one of them in an abandoned 
house. 2  All four witnesses identified Waller at trial, and despite alibi 
testimony, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. After serving 
more than 15 years in prison, DNA evidence conclusively proved that Waller 
did not commit the crime and another man, Byron Bell, was the real attacker. 
The Dallas District Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Unit reviewed the case 
and obtained confessions from Bell and his accomplice, Lemondo Simmons. 
Waller was freed on July 3, 2008, after serving more than 15 years in prison 
for a crime he did not commit. 
Eyewitness misidentification is one of the leading causes of wrongful 
convictions nationwide, playing a role in about 70% of convictions 
overturned through DNA testing. 3  More than 30 years of social science 
research has proven that eyewitness identification is often inaccurate and 
unreliable.4 Despite its proven inaccuracy, eyewitness identification is still 
used to target suspects in nearly 80,000 cases each year.5 
Much has been written about eyewitness identification and wrongful 
convictions.6 This article will focus on in-court identifications—specifically, 
the use of first time, in-court stranger identifications where there was no 
pretrial identification (e.g., lineup)7—and how the body of social science 
 
2 Patrick Waller, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-
imprisonment/patrick-waller (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).  
3 Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org 
/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); see also State v. 
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 885 (N.J. 2011).   
4 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 50 (2011) (“[E]yewitness testimony is among the least reliable 
forms of evidence and yet persuasive to juries.”) (quoting Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV., 603, 605 (1998)). 
5 Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of 
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (citing Alvin G. Goldstein et al., 
Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL. 
PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71–74 (1989)). 
6 See, e.g., Jules Epstein, Irreparable Misidentifications and Reliability: Reassessing the 
Threshold for Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification, 58 VILL. L. REV. 69 (2013); Dana 
Walsh, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater State Involvement to 
Ensure Fundamental Fairness, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1415 (2013). 
7 As early as 1996, even without the benefit of the breadth of the scientific evidence 
available today, Professor Evan Mandery argued for the per se exclusion of suggestive in-
court identifications, finding “no basis in law or public policy to differentiate the treatment of 
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research undermines the reliability of such identifications. In first time, in-
court identifications, a witness is identifying the defendant for the first time 
after he or she has already been identified by the state as the suspect and 
charged with the crime. The defendant is isolated at the defense table and is 
often the only person in the courtroom matching the perpetrator’s description. 
As this article demonstrates, the courtroom is an inherently suggestive setting 
for a stranger identification conducted for the first time, and such an 
identification is particularly unreliable because the witness’s memory 
inevitably decays or becomes distorted in the time between the incident and 
the defendant’s trial. 
We use as an example the case of Jerrin Hickman, an African-American 
male who was convicted of murder in Oregon after two young white women 
identified him for the first time in the courtroom at trial.8 The authors of this 
article take no position on the merits of Hickman’s conviction, but raise the 
case because the suggestiveness of the identifications casts a shadow of 
uncertainty on the conviction, leaving the integrity of its resolution open to 
debate—a result unsatisfying to prosecutors, defendants, and the courts.9 
Hickman’s case began on New Year’s Eve 2007 when two young white 
women (D and N) were present when Christopher Monette was shot during 
a party in Northeast Portland, Oregon.10 Police were called to investigate 
Monette’s murder. Within hours of the shooting, D told the investigating 
officer that “she didn’t see the shooting and really couldn’t describe much,” 
and, as a result, she “could not give specific descriptions of who was 
involved.”11 N could tell the officer only that the shooter was an African-
American man wearing a “do-rag,” who had a stocky build and was in his 
mid-twenties.12 During the two years that passed between the night of the 
shooting and Hickman’s trial, the state never conducted a lineup, photo array, 
 
in-court identifications from pre-trial identifications.” Evan J. Mandery, Due Process 
Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (1996). 
8 State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 554–57 (Or. 2014). 
9 See Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the 
Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 669–71 (2014) (discussing how the 
increased visibility of wrongful convictions has created public pressure on prosecutors to 
ensure the reliability of criminal convictions); Hon. Jonathan Lippman, Judiciary Examines 
Causes of Wrongful Convictions: New York State Task Force Issues Report, 26 CRIM. JUST., 
Fall 2011, at 12 (“Every wrongful conviction is a stain on the reputation of the courts, eroding 
public trust and confidence in the legitimacy of our institutional status and the fairness and 
accuracy of our decisions.”). 
10 See Hickman, 330 P.3d at 554–56.  
11 Id. at 555. 
12 Id. at 556. 
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or any other pretrial identification procedure to discover whether the two 
young women could identify Hickman or anyone else as the shooter.13 
At trial, nearly two years after the shooting, D took the stand, saw 
Hickman seated at the defense table, and testified that she was “95 percent 
certain” that Hickman was the shooter.14 For the very first time, D provided 
a detailed description of the shooter, which matched Hickman seated before 
her.15 Also from the stand, N pointed to Hickman sitting at the defense table 
and identified him as the shooter.16 Once again, for the first time in two years, 
N gave details about the shooter’s appearance—all matching Hickman seated 
in front of her.17 Hickman was convicted of Monette’s murder and sentenced 
to life in prison based predominantly on these two first time, in-court stranger 
identifications.18 
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court19 ruled that the identifications in 
Hickman were properly admitted under State v. Lawson,20 its 2012 landmark 
decision requiring major changes to evaluating identification evidence.21 In 
Lawson, the court changed the standard for admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions by 
taking into account more than 30 years of scientific research on eyewitness 
identification and memory. In doing so, the court rejected the balancing test 





16 Id. at 556–57. 
17 Id. 
18 The remainder of the state’s case included the testimony of one Porter, who was also 
involved in an argument with the victim the night of the murder and was “for a time a suspect.” 
State v. Hickman, 298 P.3d 619, 620 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). Several other eyewitnesses testified 
that the perpetrator had a similar physical appearance to Hickman, but were unable to make a 
positive identification because the perpetrator wore a ski mask. Hickman, 330 P.3d at 571. The 
state also presented a ski mask found at the scene, on which testing revealed the DNA of both 
Hickman and Porter. Hickman, 298 P.3d at 620.  
19 Hickman, 330 P.3d 551.  
20 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
21 See Hickman, 330 P.3d at 556–59 (describing the framework for evaluating the 
admissibility under Lawson, where the Oregon Supreme Court embraced the body of scientific 
research focused on the reliability of eyewitness identifications). 
22 The Lawson court rejected the test previously articulated in State v. Classen, 590 P.2d 
1198 (Or. 1979), finding that the test was no longer adequate based on the “considerable 
developments in both the law and the science [with regard to] eyewitness identification 
evidence.” Lawson, 291 P.3d at 678. The Classen decision was grounded in Oregon’s 
evidentiary code, but nevertheless adopted the due process analysis set forth in Manson v. 
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eyewitness identification evidence is admissible by assessing its reliability 
under the Oregon Evidence Code.23 The Hickman court failed to understand 
how the science discussed and accepted in Lawson should apply to all 
eyewitness identifications, not just those made pretrial.24 
The Oregon Supreme Court, in Lawson, was the second state supreme 
court to take a thoughtful and comprehensive approach to conforming the law 
of eyewitness identification to the scientific consensus in order to reduce 
misidentification, 25  the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions 
nationwide.26 The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first state supreme 
court to institute reform.  
The unreliability of eyewitness evidence was set out in stark relief in 
State v. Henderson, 27  where the New Jersey Supreme Court, through a 
Special Master’s Report, examined 30 years of scientific research on the 
reliability of eyewitness identification and memory.28 The Henderson Report 
concluded that “[t]he scientific findings . . . are reliable, definitive and 
 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Classen, 590 P.2d 
at 1199; see also discussion of Manson/Biggers test in Part III.  
23 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697 (“[T]he state, as the proponent of the eyewitness’ identification 
must establish all preliminary facts necessary to establish admissibility of the eyewitness 
evidence.”). 
24 The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony 
of D and N, concluding that the variables embraced in Lawson “weigh[ed] heavily against 
reliability,” particularly because the first time, in-court identification procedure was “similar 
to, but significantly more suggestive than, a ‘show-up,’” and further, because the witness is 
“always aware of whom police officers have targeted as a suspect,” and it is “obvious that the 
state’s prosecutorial apparatus [confirmed those suspicions].” Hickman, 330 P.3d at 624 
(citations omitted). The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing the in-court procedure 
from suggestive pretrial procedure, and concluding that because the factfinder “can observe 
the witness’s demeanor . . . during the identification process” and the identification is subject 
to “immediate challenge through cross-examination,” assessment of the reliability of that 
identification is the province of the jury. Hickman, 330 P.3d at 564. 
25 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685. (“[W]e believe that it is imperative that law enforcement, the 
bench, and the bar be informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature 
regarding the principles of accountability and fairness.”). 
26 Out of 316 DNA exonerations to date, mistaken identifications played a role in 75 
percent of those wrongful convictions. Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 3; see also 
GARRETT, supra note 4, at 48 (noting that 76 percent of the first 250 convictions overturned 
due to DNA evidence since 1989 involved eyewitness misidentification).  
27 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
28 Id. at 916. According to one of the testifying researchers, this report represented the 
“gold standard in terms of the applicability of social science research to the law.”  
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unquestionably fit for use in the courtroom.”29 Relying on these scientific 
findings, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a breakthrough decision 
requiring major changes in the way its courts evaluate identification evidence 
at trial and instruct juries.30 The new framework instructs New Jersey courts 
to greatly expand the factors that courts and juries should consider in 
assessing the risk of misidentification, emphasizing, in particular, the ways 
administrators can influence the outcome of identification procedures,31 the 
inherently suggestive quality of “show-ups,” 32  how memory becomes 
decayed and distorted within a short period of time,33 and the fact that juries 
often overvalue the credibility of eyewitness testimony regardless of curative 
instructions.34   
In addition to the Lawson and Henderson decisions, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently convened a special committee to 
study the science and law regarding eyewitness identifications and 
recommended numerous changes to the law, including taking judicial notice 
of the 30 years of science reviewed and accepted by the Henderson and 
Lawson courts.35  Even before the landmark decisions in Henderson and 
Lawson, other state courts embraced the task of building upon the federal 
floor and developing enhanced procedures grounded in state constitutions.36 
It is likely that other jurisdictions will follow. 
Despite the recent advances in assessing the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, the focus to date has largely been identifications made 
pretrial.37 Little has been written about identifications made for the first time 
 
29 SUPREME COURT OF N.J., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, STATE V. HENDERSON 73 
(2008), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20
BRIEF%20(00621142).PDF. 
30 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 927–29. 
31 Id. at 896–902 (discussing blind administration, pre-identification instructions, lineup 
construction, and other ways that government actors can increase the reliability of an 
identification). 
32 Id. at 902–03. A show-up is a procedure where police officers present an eyewitness 
with a single suspect for identification. 
33 Id. at 907. 
34 Id. at 910–12 (“[J]urors do not evaluate eyewitness memory in a manner consistent with 
psychological theory and findings.”) (quoting Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1990)). 
35 SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GRP: ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES (2013) at 59, http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/ 
eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf.  
36 See infra Section III.C. 
37 Both the Henderson and Lawson methodologies presuppose the performance of a 
pretrial identification, since otherwise, the defense would likely not have sufficient knowledge 
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in the courtroom, like those made in the case of Jerrin Hickman described 
above. 
Five months after Hickman was decided in Oregon and during the 
authorship of this article, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts 
decided Commonwealth v. Crayton,38 in which the court excluded a similar 
first time, in-court identification. The Crayton court in Massachusetts 
specifically took issue with the reasoning of the Hickman court in Oregon 
and sharply disagreed with the basis of the Hickman ruling.39  
Earlier in 2014, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) published 
an insightful and much-anticipated report on assessing eyewitness 
identifications. The NAS properly recommended that “[a]n identification of 
the kind dealt with in this report typically should not occur for the first time 
in the courtroom.”40 Neither Crayton nor the NAS report, however, discusses 
in detail the science undermining the reliability of first time, in-court 
identifications. 
As discussed below, a first time, in-court identification is inherently 
suggestive because the defendant has already been identified by the state as 
the suspect and charged with the crime. The witness is well aware that the 
individual seated at the defense table is not only a suspect, but is also the 
suspect and the only one on trial. In Hickman, the first time, in-court 
identification also took place more than two years after the incident occurred 
and involved a cross-racial identification where the defendant was the only 
black man in the well of the courtroom.41 The factors in Hickman are of 
concern in any identification. 
Unfortunately, the Hickman court failed to truly appreciate the 
suggestiveness of outside factors at play in the first time, in-court 
identifications. Rather than apply the accepted science, 42  the Oregon 
Supreme Court mistakenly believed that prejudice from suggestion can be 
“cured” through cross examination by defense counsel, a jury’s presence 
during the in-court identification, and a trial judge’s evaluation.43 The belief 
 
of the relevant factors affecting the reliability of the identification needed to challenge its 
admission. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22; State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690–97 (Or. 
2012). 
38 21 N.E.3d 157 (Mass. 2014).  
39 Id. at 168–70. 
40 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: 
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 110 (2014).   
41 State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 557–58 (Or. 2014).  
42 See infra Part II for discussion of the science.   
43 Hickman, 330 P.3d at 564.  
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that suggestion can be “cured” is misplaced based on what we have learned 
from the more than 500 wrongful convictions around the country involving 
mistaken eyewitness identifications44 and the 30 years of science that has 
dramatically changed our understanding of the human memory. 
While in-court identifications have an extraordinarily powerful effect on 
juries, all such identifications are potentially vulnerable to post-event 
memory distortion and decay. In fact, the factors that lead psychologists and 
scholars (and now a few courts) to question the ability of jurors to assess the 
reliability of pretrial identifications are present in their purest forms in a first 
time, in-court identification. 45  Absent an identification procedure that 
effectively tests the witness’s memory, 46  it is impossible to know if the 
witness’s identification of the defendant is a product of his or her original 
memory or a product of the extraordinarily suggestive circumstances created 
by the in-court identification procedure. In such in-court identifications, the 
risk of misidentification is heightened by suggestive circumstances that are 
no different than “show-ups,”47 (a procedure where police officers present an 
eyewitness with a single suspect for identification), which have been 
condemned by science and courts.48 
 
44 See THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx# (Last visited May 31, 2015); 
see also Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, 
and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 774–83 (2007) (describing 
how cross-examination fails to undercut the reliability of an identification, even when 
addressing factors known to undermine the reliability of an identification, such as cross-racial 
identifications, the presence of a weapon during the crime, and memory decay). 
45 See the discussion regarding the science and factors that affect reliability, infra Part II.  
46 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–98 (N.J. 2011) (discussing means to 
effectively test an eyewitness’s memory, including advising the witness that the suspect may 
not be present in the lineup, presenting a lineup made up of look-alikes with a minimum 
number of fillers, and preventing the witness from viewing one suspect in multiple 
identification procedures). 
47 Show-ups are identification procedures where only one person is presented to the 
eyewitness “to see if [the witness] will identify that person as the perpetrator.” Jessica Lee, 
Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects from the Consequences of Non-
Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755, 797 (2005) (arguing that non-exigent 
show-ups should never be permissible, even with the suspect’s consent). See generally Amy 
Luria, Showup Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and a Discussion 
of Necessary Changes, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 515 (2008) (recommending restricting when the police 
may conduct show-ups, restricting the procedures police officers may use during show-ups, 
and heightening the admissibility requirements for show-up identifications). 
48 As early as 1967, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the “practice of showing 
suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has 
been widely condemned.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (citation omitted); see 
also Henderson, 27 A.3d at 903 (“[T]he main problem with showups is that . . . they fail to 
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In this article, we recognize the possibility that, as more states around 
the country require more reliable, science-based pretrial identification 
procedures through case law or policy changes, police and prosecutors may 
opt for first time, in-court identifications when the witness is equivocal and 
the courtroom setting inures to the benefit of the state. It is our contention 
that these identifications should be held inadmissible to encourage police and 
prosecutors to conduct reliable out-of-court identifications, whether pretrial 
or with leave during trial. As courts begin to accept the vast amount of science 
indicating how eyewitness perception and memory truly work, there is no 
principled basis for limiting the application of the science to pretrial 
identifications and carving out exceptions for in-court identifications. The 
same issues of perception and memory are at play in both settings. Now is 
the time to scrutinize the practice of first time, in-court stranger 
identifications especially in light of the contrary holdings in Hickman and 
Crayton.49 
In Part II, we set forth the basic science related to memory and 
perception and how it applies to first time, in-court identifications. In Part III, 
we discuss how courts have historically addressed claims of suggestiveness 
in the context of eyewitness identifications and, specifically, how they have 
handled in-court identifications including first time stranger identifications. 
And in Part IV, we analyze first time, in-court identifications under the 
scientific framework as articulated and accepted by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Lawson and the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson, both of 
which recognize 30 years of science that proves that our memories are easily 
influenced by factors beyond our control and, often, beyond our perception. 
II. SCIENCE50 
While scientists have been studying memory and eyewitness 
identification for more than 100 years, social and cognitive psychologists 
began conducting and publishing programmatic memory research in the 
 
provide a safeguard against witnesses with poor memories or those inclined to guess, because 
every mistaken identification in a showup will point to the suspect.”); State v. Lawson, 291 
P.3d 673, 686 (Or. 2012) (“Police showups are generally regarded as inherently suggestive . . . 
because the witness is always aware of whom police officers have targeted as a suspect.”). 
49 This article focuses strictly on first time, in-court identifications. For helpful information 
about in-court identifications following a suggestive pretrial identification, see generally 
Brandon Garrett, Eyewitness and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451 (2012). 
50 This Part provides a brief overview of some of the significant scientific concepts related 
to eyewitness identification. For further information about the science, see generally 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. 
Loftus eds., 1984).  
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1970s.51 Since then, however, much has been discovered about how memory 
and perception actually work, and most significantly, research has 
demonstrated that memory is far more complex than previously thought. 
Studies have found that memory is inherently unstable and subject to 
change52 and that the human mind is not at all like a tape recorder—it neither 
records nor recalls events exactly as seen.53 
A. HUMAN MEMORY IS A RECONSTRUCTION 
Frederic Bartlett, the first scientist to conduct research on reconstructive 
memory, found that in order to make sense of an event we go through a 
process called “effort after meaning.”54 Instead of storing an exact replica of 
the event, we combine our perceptions with elements of existing knowledge 
and experience to form a reconstructive memory.55 That reconstruction (or, 
initially, construction) can occur in any of the three stages conventionally 
used to describe the sequence of remembering: A person perceives the event 
(acquisition stage); then, after time passes, attempts to remember the 
event/information (retention stage); and finally, tries to recall the event/stored 
information (the retrieval stage).56 At each of these three stages, multiple 
 
51 See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years 
Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 5 (2009) (discussing the development of eyewitness 
identification science). 
52 Once created, memories are not fixed, contrary to the popular conception that memories 
are “permanent imprints that might fade but are otherwise stable.” MEMORY AND LAW 5 (Lynn 
Nadel & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012). Research has demonstrated that “stable 
memories can be altered when they are reactivated,” and “memory is fundamentally 
malleable.” Id. “The most important implication is that when memories are replayed, as when 
either a victim or a witness is being questioned by investigators, or giving testimony in the 
courtroom, or even discussing events with others, this process of reactivating and replaying 
memory inalterably changes it going forward.” Id.  
53 “The act of remembering, says eminent memory researcher Professor Elizabeth F. 
Loftus of the University of California, Irvine, is “more akin to putting puzzle pieces together 
than retrieving a video recording.” Hal Arkowitz & Scott O. Lillienfeld, Do The “Eyes” Have 
It?, SCI. AM. MIND Jan./Feb. 2010, at 68–69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 44 (2d ed. 1995). Bartlett’s study reveals that individuals bring their own “native 
or acquired temperament, bias and interests” into situations requiring perception and memory, 
and they utilize those individual tendencies “so as to make [their] reaction the ‘easiest,’ or the 
least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed that is at the time possible.” 
55 Id. at 213 (“Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and 
fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation 
of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experience . . . .”). 
56 See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 12–13 
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factors can impact and alter a person’s memory.57 As a result, information 
passing through the memory process can be distorted.58 And all three stages 
can be affected by personal perception, which is a “highly selective” process 
dependent upon both psychological factors, including “experience, learning, 
preferences, biases, and expectations,” and physical senses.59 
Scientists have demonstrated that the manner in which a perceived event 
is logged in a witness’s mind may be influenced by the expectations of that 
witness.60 Because the mind can only process a certain amount of incoming 
information at one time, perception is extremely selective.61 This means that 
the mind filters out information that is less focused.62 For example, in the 
acquisition stage, factors such as lighting, stress, and duration of the event all 
come into play.63 In the retention stage, factors such as normal forgetfulness, 
the passage of time, and the receipt of new information after the event all 
influence a person’s memory. 64  And finally, in the retrieval stage, 
questioning used to elicit information has been found to have a serious impact 
on a person’s memory.65 Using this accepted model and conducting hundreds 
of studies, social scientists have reached a consensus on certain factors that 
impact the ability of eyewitnesses to perceive and remember events 
accurately.66 
 
(4th ed. 2007). 
57 Id. at 13. 
58 See A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 3 (1979) (citing 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 22 (1979)); Cindy J. O’Hagan, Note, When 
Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 745 
(1993). 
59 Fradella, supra note 5, at 5 (citing Robert Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness 
Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 75, 76 (1976); Frederick E. Chemay, Unreliable 
Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. 
REV. 721, 724 (1985) (citation omitted)). 
60 See Fradella, supra note 5, at 7.  
61 Id. at 5. 
62 Id. at 5–6. 
63 LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 56, at 13, 16–19, 29. 
64 Id. at 53–54, 58–59. 
65 Id. at 13, 70–71. 
66 See Saul Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony 
Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 413–14 (2001) (revealing 
a strong consensus among experts regarding the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony, which include “the wording of questions, lineup instructions, postevent information 
biases, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, the accuracy-confidence 
correlation, weapon focus, the forgetting curve, exposure time, and unconscious 
transference”). 
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According to Professors of Psychology Elizabeth Loftus and Gary 
Wells, to truly understand eyewitness identification in the criminal justice 
context and the reconstruction that occurs when a witness recalls a past event, 
it is important to know that when a witness recalls a past event, specific 
memory traces are encoded.67 Memory traces can be likened to other forms 
of evidence such as physical trace evidence like blood or fingerprints.68 And 
“[l]ike physical evidence, memory trace evidence can be contaminated, lost, 
destroyed, or otherwise made to produce results that can lead to an incorrect 
reconstruction of the event in question.”69 
B. MEMORY IS LESS RELIABLE OVER TIME 
Research has confirmed that testimony can become more unreliable 
with the passage of time, as the brain attempts to put certainty into a 
recollection that at times has been uncertain. 
The passage of time seems an obvious consideration when 
reconstructing a memory. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that 
memory loss occurs shortly after the initial observation, sometimes even 
within minutes or hours.70 Studies indicate that faces are often forgotten only 
a few hours after an event, and that after one day, the recall of a “strangers’ 
age, hair color, and height [is] usually inaccurate.”71 As a result, the passage 
of time between the event and the identification can seriously undermine the 
accuracy of an identification. 
It is also important to understand that “[m]emories don’t just fade,” but 
 
67 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 11 
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 617 (R.K. Otto and & I.B. Weiner eds., 2013) (“[A] criminal 
event involving an eyewitness leaves a trace in the brain of the eyewitness.”). 
68 Id. 
69 See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 688 (Or. 2012) (“Memory generally decays over 
time. Decay rates are exponential rather than linear, with the greatest proportion of memory 
loss occurring shortly after an initial observation, then leveling off over time.”); see also 
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of 
an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 139, 148 
(2008) (“[The r]ate of memory loss for an unfamiliar face is greatest right after the encounter 
and then levels off over time.”). 
70 Id. 
71 Lee, supra note 47, at 771 (citing A. DANIEL YARMEY, UNDERSTANDING POLICE AND 
POLICE WORK: PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES 299 (1990)). “If the showups were delayed, however, by 
just two hours, more than half the witnesses mistakenly ‘identified’ someone in a showup, 
compared to a rate of only 14% false identification with (target-absent) photo lineups.” DANIEL 
REISBERG, THE SCIENCE OF PERCEPTION AND MEMORY: A PRAGMATIC GUIDE FOR THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 122–23 (2014) (citations omitted). 
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with time, “they also grow.”72 What actually fades “is the initial perception, 
the actual experience of the events . . . and with each recollection the memory 
may be changed—colored by succeeding events, other people’s recollections 
or suggestions, increased understanding, or a new context.” 73  Thus, the 
realities of a past event, “when seen through the filter of our memories, are 
not objective facts but subjective, interpretive realities,” and “[w]e interpret 
the past, correcting ourselves, adding bits and pieces, deleting 
uncomplimentary or disturbing recollections, sweeping, dusting, tidying 
things up.”74 
By the time a memory is reconstructed (at the time of the identification), 
the witness has often unconsciously filled in his vague recollections with the 
image of the person in the lineup, in a photograph, or seated at the defense 
table. For example, research has shown that the high stress that may 
accompany witnessing a crime may cause the witness to focus on elements 
that we perceive as posing the greatest risk or danger (e.g., the weapon), 
causing the witness to divert his attention from other details, such as the 
identifying characteristics of the perpetrator.75 If a witness later sees a picture 
of the accused on television or in the newspaper, the witness may use those 
details to erroneously fill in details that were missed during the actual 
encounter. 76  Once that erroneous information is stored in memory, the 
witness will not be able to distinguish between his actual perceptions and 
those constructed after the fact.77 Furthermore, over time, as the witness 
continues to think about the (erroneous) details, he can become even more 
confident in his misidentification.78 
Not only can memories be erroneously distorted in the time after the 
event, but “memories can [also] be altered when they are reactivated.”79 
Professor Loftus’s numerous studies (beginning in the 1970s) about how 
people are affected by post-event misinformation indicate that when 
misleading information is incorporated into a person’s memory after an 
 
72 ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE 
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL 20 (1991). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Memories of crime scene witnesses can focus on the weapon at the expense of peripheral 
details, such as clothing of an accomplice. Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review 
of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 414 (1992). 
76 See Fradella, supra note 5, at 8. 
77 Id. at 8–9. 
78 Id. at 21. 
79 NADEL & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, supra note 52. 
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event, memory can change and lead to inaccuracies at recall. 80  This 
phenomenon is called “the misinformation effect.”81 Over the last 30 years, 
numerous scientific studies have corroborated and extended these findings.82 
Misinformation effects have been demonstrated in people of all ages and after 
different types of events.83 Research studies have used diverse methods of 
delivering the misinformation and assessing memory of the witnessed 
event.84 
Research has shown that memory can be altered as it is reactivated and 
replayed, such as when the victim or a witness is being questioned by 
investigators, or giving testimony in the courtroom, or even when discussing 
events with others. 85  For example, when being questioned by law 
enforcement or in court, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the 
questioner may give a witness subtle cues as to the correct suspect.86 In 
response to these cues, the witness may alter his testimony because fragments 
 
80 See, e.g., Bi Zhu, et al., Individual Differences in False Memory from Misinformation: 
Cognitive Factors, 18 MEMORY 543 (2010) (suggesting that people with relatively low 
intelligence and poor perceptual abilities might be more susceptible to the misinformation 
effect); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 867 (2003) 
[hereinafter Make-Believe Memories] (indicating that postevent suggestion can contaminate 
what a person remembers); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and 
Memory: The Creation of New Memories, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 100 (1989) 
(indicating that misleading information presented after an event can lead people to erroneous 
reports of that misinformation).  
81 See Loftus & Hoffman, supra note 80, at 100. 
82 See Maria S. Zaragoza et al., Misinformation Effect and the Suggestibility of 
Eyewitness Memory, DO JUSTICE AND LET THE SKY FALL 35, 36 (2006), available at http:// 
www.personal.kent.edu/~mzaragoz/publications/Zaragoza%20chapter%204%20Garry%20                
Hayne.pdf. 
83 See, e.g., Uta Jaschinski & Dirk Wentura, Misleading Postevent Information and 
Working Memory Capacity: An Individual Differences Approach to Eyewitness Memory, 16 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 223 (2002) (examining how individual differences in working 
memory capacity relate to the effect of misleading postevent information on memory for the 
original event); Henry Roediger & Lisa Geraci, Aging and the Misinformation Effect: A 
Neuropsychological Analysis, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 321 (2007) (showing that older 
adults are more susceptible to the deleterious effect of misinformation than are younger adults 
and that their increased susceptibility is mediated by their neuropsychological functioning).  
84 See Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, supra note 80 at 546 (discussing the variety of 
scientific research addressing the “misinformation effect”). 
85 NADEL & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, supra note 52. 
86 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d, 872, 896 (N.J. 2011) (discussing how a non-blind 
administrator can sway an eyewitness to identify a suspect with as little as “innocuous words 
and subtle cues—pauses, gestures, hesitations, or smiles”) (citing Ryann M. Haw & Ronald 
P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1107 (2004)). 
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of his memory may unknowingly combine with information provided by the 
questioner.87 This leads to inaccurate recall and skewed testimony. Thus, the 
“retrieval processes are crucial,” since witnesses “usually take the traces of 
experience and weave them together into a more or less coherent description 
of a remembered event, a description that depends heavily on the cues used 
during retrieval.”88 
C. WITNESS CONFIDENCE IS HIGHLY MALLEABLE 
Not only is an eyewitness’s memory of a crime highly malleable and 
subject to change, but so is an eyewitness’s confidence in the accuracy of his 
memory of the crime.89 Because so much of the memory process takes place 
on an unconscious level, by the time an identification occurs, a witness may 
feel completely confident and truly believe that a mistaken identification is 
accurate.90 The lack of a connection between accuracy and confidence in an 
eyewitness is “one of the most consistent findings in the memory research 
literature.”91 The majority of studies find a weak or nonexistent link between 
an eyewitness’s subjective level of confidence and the accuracy of his 
memory.92 One meta-analysis of thirty-five eyewitness identification studies 
found that confident eyewitnesses were only “somewhat more accurate” than 
non-confident eyewitnesses.93  While there are numerous factors that can 
 
87 See Henry L. Roediger III et al., The Curious Complexity Between Confidence and 
Accuracy in Reports from Memory, in MEMORY AND LAW 91 (Lynn Nadel & Walter P. 
Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012) (describing how “retrieval cues” determine whether or not an 
event is retrieved from memory). 
88 Id. 
89 See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for 
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 624 (1998) (“Confidence 
malleability refers to the tendency for an eyewitness to become more (or less) confident in his 
or her identification as a function of events that occur after the identification.”). 
90 See C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: 
Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 720 (1994) 
(demonstrating how eyewitness confidence “can be dramatically inflated and deflated 
independently” of “the extent that the identified person seems perceptually familiar or matches 
the eyewitness’s memory particularly well”). 
91 Kevin Krug, The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy: Current Thoughts of 
the Literature and a New Area of Research, 3 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 7, 31 (2007). 
92 See id. But see Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in 
Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 486 (2001) (“The 
relationship between confidence and suspect/foil identification for the live lineups is a solid 
one.”). 
93 Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating 
Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 349 (1997). 
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increase eyewitness confidence, including confirming feedback from police 
and prosecutors, they do not in any way improve the accuracy of an 
eyewitness’s identification. 94  Furthermore, an eyewitness is generally 
unaware that his confidence has been increased by these factors.95 Professors 
Michael Leippe and Donna Eisenstadt explain that “confidence statements 
made following an immediate post-identification confidence judgment will 
inevitably be hopelessly undiagnostic of memory accuracy. Short of being 
restricted to a hermetically sealed room until the trial, it is hard to imagine an 
eyewitness not being subjected to manipulative influences on his or her 
confidence.”96 
In response to concerns that the psychological research into eyewitness 
memory was not applicable to the justice system, Professor Gary Wells 
categorized all the variables that can affect a person’s memory of an event 
into either “estimator” or “system” variables.97 Estimator variables are those 
that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, but cannot be 
controlled by the criminal justice system. 98  These might include such 
variables as the lighting when the crime took place or the distance of the 
witness from the perpetrator during the crime. 99  Estimator variables also 
include more complex factors, including race (identifications have proven to 
be less accurate when witnesses are identifying perpetrators of a different 
race), the presence of a weapon during a crime, and the degree of stress or 
 
94  See Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence and the 
Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS 
PSYCHOLOGY, MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 377, 417–18 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007).  
95 See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback 
to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
360, 373 (1998). 
96 See Leippe & Eisenstadt, supra note 94, at 417–18.  
97  Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables and 
Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978) (describing the 
“criminal justice implications” of memory science); see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d, 872, 
895–96 (N.J. 2011) (discussing the difference between system and estimator variables); State 
v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685–88 (Or. 2012) (same). Professor Wells also framed his research 
by stating, “[T]he goal of applied eyewitness testimony research is to generate scientific 
knowledge that will maximize the chances that a guilty defendant will be justly convicted 
while minimizing the chances that an innocent defendant will be mistakenly convicted.” 
Wells, supra, at 1546.  
98 Wells, supra note 97, at 1548 (explaining that estimator variables are so characterized 
because “in actual crimes, one can at best only estimate the role of such factors”) (emphasis 
added). 
99 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 687. 
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trauma a witness experienced when seeing the perpetrator. 100  System 
variables are those variables that the criminal justice system can control and 
tend to come into play during the retrieval process.101 System variables can 
have a strong impact on the probative value of eyewitness testimony, whether 
the procedure used is a lineup, photo array, witness interview, or other 
identification process.102 
In light of the scientific community’s consolidation of the variables that 
affect eyewitness memory, the U.S. Department of Justice incorporated these 
variables into a manual for law enforcement with recommendations for 
collecting eyewitness evidence. 103  These recommendations describe 
safeguards that law enforcement can implement to protect memory evidence 
and increase the likelihood of an accurate identification.104  As discussed 
above, the highest courts of New Jersey and Oregon have embraced the 
usefulness of system and estimator variables in assessing the reliability of 
eyewitness evidence. Despite the increased acceptance of memory science 
within the criminal justice system, most courts continue to cling to the idea 
that in-court identifications are different. These courts maintain that the 
reliability of a first time, in-court identification is effectively tested through 
cross-examination and jury assessment, relying on outdated understandings 
of juror comprehension and ignoring the inherently suggestive atmosphere of 
the courtroom. 
III. STATE OF THE LAW: IN-COURT EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 
The problem with first time, in-court identifications is that no one—not 
the jury, not the court, and not the parties themselves—can tell whether the 
 
100 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 52–53 (2006). 
101 Id. at 47–48. 
102 Id. at 46. 
103 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NCJ 178240, EYEWITNESS 
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter GUIDE], 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, NCJ 188678, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf. 
Researchers involved in the working group that produced these guides also published an 
academic paper that describes the theoretical basis for these recommendations. See Wells et 
al., supra note 4, at 9–10.  
104 The Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, in developing these guides, 
describes its objectives as including “[h]eighten[ing] the validity/accuracy of eyewitness 
evidence as police, prosecutors, and other criminal justice professionals work with witnesses 
to identify suspects,” and “[i]mprov[ing] the criminal justice system’s ability to evaluate the 
strength and accuracy of eyewitness evidence.” GUIDE, supra note 103, at 4. 
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in-court identification is a product of the courtroom setting (where the 
defendant is seated at the defense table and the witness is aware that the state 
believes him to be guilty) or is an independent memory that has not been 
tainted. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long struggled with the admission of 
identification testimony when that testimony may be contaminated by outside 
factors. 105  The Court first raised serious concerns about eyewitness 
identification evidence in the late 1960s, and, in response, created a per se 
exclusionary rule to prevent the admission of identifications that take place 
after the start of formal proceedings if the defendant is physically present and 
denied the right to counsel.106 That test became largely immaterial as the 
police and prosecutors moved toward identification procedures that do not 
require the presence of the defendant, like photographic arrays. 
The Court later opened the door for defendants to challenge an 
identification under due process if it is “so impermissibly suggestive as to 
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”107 
That test, however, was later diluted to the point that even identifications 
contaminated by suggestion may be deemed nonetheless reliable.108 
Thirty years of social science has since undermined the Supreme Court’s 
standard, but the Court has refused to take the reins on bringing the law on 
eyewitness identification in line with the prevailing scientific research 
 
105 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“[T]he confrontation compelled 
by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification 
evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might 
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification 
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: ‘What is the worth of identification testimony even when 
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of 
such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English 
and American trials.’”). 
106  Id. at 235–40. 
107 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); see Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 
440, 442–43 (1969) (holding that, within the totality of the circumstances, the identification 
procedure was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification as to be a denial of due process of law”) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293, 302 (1967)). 
108 See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972) (upholding the admission of 
eyewitness testimony subjected to suggestive procedures even where seven months passed 
between the crime and confrontation, with the Court finding “no substantial likelihood of 
misidentification”); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (holding that the 
admission of unreliable eyewitness evidence does not offend due process, so long as the 
identification lacks the “taint of improper state conduct”). 
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findings. Instead, it has left the task up to the state courts.109 A select few 
states have risen to the challenge, rejecting the Supreme Court’s inadequate 
test and opting for a standard guided by the real experts, the scientists.110 
Today, these states that have led the way to reform eyewitness identification 
procedures are in prime position to keep moving the ball forward by 
addressing first time, in-court identifications. The discussion below explores 
the state of the law and the reasons why the current standard for eyewitness 
identification evidence is inadequate, especially in assessing first time, in-
court identifications. 
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZED CONCERNS ABOUT 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS IN CREATING A SHORT-LIVED, 
PER SE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Until 1967, courts throughout the United States took the position that 
suggestiveness in pretrial identification procedures affects only the weight 
and not the admissibility of a subsequent in-court identification.111 The Court 
departed from that rule in 1967 when it decided United States v. Wade and 
Gilbert v. California on the same day.112 In Wade and Gilbert, the Court 
ruled, for the first time, that eyewitness evidence could be categorically 
excluded.113 In both of the cases, the witnesses had identified the defendants 
at post-indictment lineups conducted without notice to, and in the absence of, 
 
109 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728–29 (expressing “unwillingness to enlarge the domain of due 
process,” while pointing to the presence of safeguards outside of the Constitution, such as 
enhanced eyewitness jury instructions adopted by states, state rules regarding the admissibility 
of evidence, and the presentation of expert testimony as permitted under state law). 
110 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (“[The federal test] does not offer an 
adequate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct. It also 
overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who 
honestly believe their testimony is accurate.”); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 688 (Or. 2012) 
(describing the reliability factors embraced in previous state precedent, which are grounded in 
the Supreme Court’s factor test, as “both incomplete and, at times, inconsistent with modern 
scientific findings”). 
111 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 382–83 (1968); see e.g., People v. Crenshaw, 155 N.E.2d 599, 
604 (Ill. 1959) (“[T]he circumstances [surrounding the identification procedure] would not 
completely impair and destroy the evidence of identification, but would only affect its weight 
and credibility.”).  
112 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 
272 (1967).  
113 In both cases, the Court held eyewitness testimony that is the product of a constitutional 
violation must be categorically excluded in order to properly deter official misconduct and 
preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 235–40; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272–
75. 
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the defendants’ counsel.114 The Court ruled that the defendants were entitled 
to counsel at the pretrial lineups to prevent unfairness in the lineups and 
assure effective cross-examination at trial.115 Because the defendants were 
denied their absolute right to counsel at the lineups, those lineups were 
deemed improper and the results excluded.116 
The Court also recognized that the unlawful pretrial identification can 
potentially affect the admissibility of the later in-court identification.117 The 
Court stated that in-court identifications after the illegal lineup were 
admissible only if “the in-court identifications were based upon observations 
of the suspect other than the lineup identification.”118 That is, the in-court 
identification must have an “independent origin.” 119  The test involved 
consideration of the witness’s prior opportunity to observe the alleged 
criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup 
description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification of 
another person prior to lineup, the identification by picture of the defendant 
prior to lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the 
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.120 
The Wade Court’s recognition that “[s]uggestion can be created 
intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways,”121 is striking for its 
time. Wade was decided long before the development (and acceptance) of 
social scientists’ recognition of the impact of suggestion on eyewitness 
testimony. Yet, the Wade Court remarked that “the influence of improper 
suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more 
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor—perhaps it is responsible 
for more such errors than all other factors combined.” 122  The Court 
recognized as “suggestive” a number of procedures, including where “the 
witness is told by the police that they have caught the culprit after which the 
 
114 Wade, 388 U.S. at 219–20; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 269–70. 
115 Wade, 388 U.S. at 230–31. 
116 Id. at 237; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272. 
 117 In Wade, the court refused to adopt a per se rule of exclusion of an in-court 
identification following an unconstitutional identification procedure, but recognized that the 
exclusion of only the testimony regarding the lineup itself would “render the right to counsel 
an empty one,” since a pretrial identification serves to “crystallize” a witness’s identification 
and cause his testimony to appear “unequivocal.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 240–42. 
118 Id. at 240. 
119 Id. at 242. 
120 Id. at 241. 
121 Id. at 229. 
122 Id. at 218 (citing PATRICK M. WALL & C. C. THOMAS, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965)). 
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defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail[.]”123 The 
Court noted, “It is hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the 
suggestion to the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the 
police.”124 
This situation, found suggestive by the Supreme Court, is remarkably 
similar to the first time, in-court identification procedure—when the witness 
is told by the prosecutor that the police have caught the culprit and then sees 
the defendant for the first time inside the courtroom, seated at the defense 
table having been charged with the crime. The witness is acutely aware that 
the police and the prosecution believe the one presented is guilty. The Wade 
Court was clear in its opinion that, in the pretrial context, the likelihood is 
high that the witness’s identification will be influenced by the suggestion of 
guilt.125 
The Wade/Gilbert per se exclusionary rule indicates that the Court was 
on the right track and understood, even without scientific support, that 
identifications may be tainted by suggestion to such a degree as to preclude 
admissibility. The Wade Court’s per se exclusionary rule prevents the 
admission of identifications made without counsel in order to prevent 
unnecessary and suggestive procedures. Meanwhile, the “independent 
origin” test focuses on the ways in which the witness’s memory was tested 
before the illegal pretrial identification tainted his memory. That is, the 
“independent origin” test recognizes that an in-court identification may have 
been contaminated by outside forces. 126  If there is the possibility of 
contamination by an unreliable pretrial identification, the court must ask: 
Was the witness’s memory tested before the illegal pretrial identification 
such that the in-court identification can be proved to be reliable by 
comparison?127 
Although the Court acknowledged the effect that a suggestive pretrial 
identification may have on a subsequent in-court identification, the Court did 
not address the suggestiveness that inherently exists inside the courtroom. 
The Wade/Gilbert rulings were eventually limited to their facts. In 
 
123 Id. at 233. 
124 Id. at 234. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 240 (“A rule limited solely to the exclusion of testimony concerning identification 
at the lineup itself, without regard to admissibility of the courtroom identification, would 
render the right to counsel an empty one. The lineup is most often used, as in the present case, 
to crystallize the witnesses’ identification of the defendant for future reference. We have 
already noted that the lineup identification will have that effect.”). 
127 See id. at 241. 
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United States v. Ash, the Court ruled that Wade/Gilbert applies only to the 
defendant’s challenge of an in-court identification when the defendant has 
been denied counsel at a prior post-indictment lineup.128 Despite the Wade 
Court’s concerns that the defendant be assured the presence of counsel at a 
post-indictment lineup, there is no right to the presence of counsel at 
identification procedures that do not require or include the presence of the 
accused (e.g., photospreads).129 Thus, the Wade/Gilbert rule rarely applies 
today as the majority of pretrial identifications are now done through some 
form of photo array or before formal charges when the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel does not apply.130 
On the same day it decided Wade/Gilbert, the Supreme Court also 
decided Stovall v. Denno, in which the Court, for the first time, analyzed 
identification evidence under a due process analysis.131 In Stovall, police 
officers presented the defendant Stovall in handcuffs to the victim two days 
after the crime, while she was recovering in the hospital.132 There was no 
notice given to Stovall’s attorney.133 Stovall was the only suspect presented 
to the victim and the only black man in the room at the time of the 
identification.134 Police officers repeatedly asked the victim if Stovall “was 
the man.”135 Stovall was convicted based on the identification and sentenced 
to death.136 The Court held that such a “show up” may be challenged under a 
due process analysis that “depends on the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding it[.]”137 The Court recognized that “[t]he practice of showing 
suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identifying the suspect, and not 
as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.”138 The Court, however, held 
the identification admissible because the victim might not have survived and 
she was the only witness capable of exonerating the suspect, making the 
show-up “imperative.”139 The Court put the recognized suggestiveness aside 
 
128 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 
129 Id.  
130 Garrett, supra note 4, at 50 (citing Wells, supra note 4, at 608).  
131 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967). 





137 Id. at 302. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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and instead focused on the need for evidence that would otherwise be lost.140 
The Court’s condemnation for show-ups, however, was clear. That 
condemnation should apply with just as much force to first time, in-court 
identifications where the defendant is singled out in the courtroom and is 
already on trial for the crime. It is rarely, if ever, necessary to conduct a first 
time, in-court identification, making the Stovall Court’s “need for the 
evidence” analysis inapposite.  
Only a few times in its history has the Court found an identification 
procedure sufficiently suggestive to violate due process. For example, in 
Foster v. California, the Court found a due process violation on 
suggestiveness grounds where there were three different identification 
procedures.141 During the first procedure, a suggestive lineup, the witness 
failed to identify the suspect.142 During the second, a one man “show-up,” the 
witness could only make a tentative identification.143 Undeterred, the police 
arranged another lineup at which the witness finally was able to identify the 
suspect.144 The Court found that the procedure “made it all but inevitable that 
[the witness] would identify [the defendant] whether or not he was in fact 
‘the man.’”145 That is, “[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 
‘This is the man.’”146 
While the Supreme Court itself has never addressed the issue of first 
time, in-court identifications directly, its past recognition of “suggestiveness” 
in Wade, Stovall, and Foster makes it difficult to comprehend how such 
identifications have withstood challenge. The explanation, it seems, is that 
the Court has diluted its standard over time to create a test under which even 
suggestive identifications are deemed reliable and admissible because they 
do not rise to the Court’s level of being “unnecessarily suggestive,” as 
discussed below.147 Furthermore, the Court erroneously maintains that cross-
examination is an effective tool for undermining an unreliable eyewitness 
identification and overestimates the ability of jurors to distinguish between 
confidence that is the product of suggestive circumstances and confidence 
that actually signifies accuracy.148  
 
140 Id. 
141 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). 
142 Id. at 441. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 441–42. 
145 Id. at 443. 
146 Id. 
147 See infra Section III.B. 
148 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 732 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
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B. JUST FIVE YEARS AFTER WADE/GILBERT, THE SUPREME COURT 
DILUTED ITS OWN STANDARD BY MOVING TO A “TOTALITY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES” TEST THAT IS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE 
Any door that Stovall opened to challenge an identification under due 
process has since been effectively closed. Furthermore, over the years, the 
Court has whittled away at due process so that even a suggestive 
identification procedure can be found reliable.149 The first major dilution of 
the ruling was in 1972 in Neil v. Biggers, when the U.S. Supreme Court 
created a five-factor test to determine whether identification evidence 
violates due process under the “totality of the circumstances.”150 Five years 
later, in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court found that, under the Biggers test, 
“[t]he admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary 
identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the 
identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.”151 That is, the Court 
held that even suggestive and unnecessary identification procedures may be 
reliable. Biggers and Manson eroded due process protection against 
suggestive pretrial identifications so substantially that it arguably ceased to 
exist. It could be said that the Manson Court brought the analysis to where it 
began before Wade—as a challenge to the weight, and not the admissibility, 
of the evidence: 
[W]e cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is ‘a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ Short of that point, such evidence is for the 
jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American 
juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the 
jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight 
of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.152 
 
(“At trial, an eyewitness’ artificially inflated confidence in an identification’s accuracy [based 
on suggestive circumstances] complicates the jury’s task of assessing witness credibility and 
reliability. It also impairs the defendant’s ability to attack the eyewitness’ credibility.”). 
149 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384–86 (1968) (showing the witness six 
photographs in which the defendant appeared several times was not a violation of due process 
“even though the identification procedure employed may have in some respects fallen short of 
the ideal”); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198–200 (1972) (“It is the likelihood of 
misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to due process[.] . . . But as Stovall makes 
clear, the admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process.”); cf. 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 116 (1977) (affirming the statement in Biggers that 
“[t]he admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary identification 
procedure does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects 
of reliability.”). 
150 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200. 
151 Manson, 432 U.S. at 106. 
152  Id. at 116 (citing Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384 (1968)). 
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Social science has since proved the Manson Court wrong and its test 
woefully inadequate.153 Yet, the Manson due process analysis of the 1970s is 
alive and well, and, today, is the leading framework used for assessing 
eyewitness identification procedures in federal and state courts.154 
To be clear, under the Manson framework, the burden rests on the 
defendant to show why the identification was unduly suggestive.155 Even if 
he is successful in meeting this burden, the court must still consider the 
“totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the identification is 
nonetheless reliable, despite its suggestiveness.156 To evaluate the totality of 
circumstances and whether the identification is reliable, the court considers 
the five Biggers factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at 
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the 
crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the defendant; 
(4) the witness’s level of certainty when identifying the suspect at the 
confrontation; and (5) the length of time that has elapsed between the crime 
and the confrontation.157 
The Manson analysis has failed to meet the Court’s goals of promoting 
fairness and reliability to avoid misidentifications. The Biggers factors have 
proven to be poor indicators of reliability, largely because the focus is based 
strictly on information reported by a witness who may feel certain in his 
memory, instead of on an examination of objective factors. If a suggestive 
identification procedure takes place and the identification is excluded, the 
court still asks the witness about his recollection of the crime. Yet, it is not 
possible for the witness to distinguish between observations at the scene and 
the subsequent suggestive identification because his mind will attempt to 
make sense out of the entire event by making the two compatible.158 There is 
 
153 See infra Part IV. 
154 See e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS 
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 67 (2010) (instructing jurors to evaluate eyewitness testimony based on 
the witness’s credibility and on the following factors: “(1) the capacity and opportunity of the 
eyewitness to observe the offender based upon the length of time for observation and the 
conditions at the time of observation, including lighting and distance; (2) whether the 
identification was the product of the eyewitness’s own recollection or was the result of 
subsequent influence or suggestiveness; (3) any inconsistent identifications made by the 
eyewitness; (4) the witness’s familiarity with the subject identified; (5) the strength of earlier 
and later identifications; (6) lapses of time between the event and the identification[s]; and (7) 
the totality of circumstances surrounding the eyewitness’s identification”).  
155 Manson, 432 U.S. at 117. 
156 Id. at 110–14. 
157 Id. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200). 
158 See BARTLETT, supra note 54, at 14-15. 
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no way to cleanse the memory of suggestion.159 
Moreover, the Manson analysis does not take into account the results of 
the last 30 years of social science research. As described above in Part II, 
scientific studies have shown that the Manson approach uses an incomplete 
list of factors, some of which can be skewed by faulty police practices. In 
fact, an abundance of social science research indicates that eyewitnesses are 
vulnerable to suggestion,160 and that in most criminal cases, the eyewitness’s 
confidence has little or no correlation with accuracy. 161  In addition, 
eyewitness confidence is extremely malleable, and, thus, easily enhanced 
when an identification is confirmed by another witness or by the police.162 
Although it seems that courts generally recognize that eyewitness 
identifications may be unreliable,163 the Supreme Court is unlikely to revisit 
its faulty due process analysis anytime soon. In January 2012, in Perry v. 
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of eyewitness 
identification for the first time since 1977.164 It was clear to some observers 
during oral arguments that “this case [was] not only the wrong vehicle for 
solving the problem of mistaken eyewitness identifications, but that the 
Supreme Court believe[d] itself the wrong institution to fix it.”165 The Court 
ultimately ruled that the Due Process Clause does not require an inquiry into 
 
159 See supra note 53. “The act of remembering, says eminent memory researcher 
Professor Elizabeth F. Loftus of the University of California, Irvine, is more akin to putting 
puzzle pieces together than retrieving a video recording.” Hal Arkowitz & Scott O. 
Lillienfeld, Do the "Eyes" Have It? Sci. Am, Mind Jan./Feb. 2010, at 68, 69 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
160 See Bill Nettles et al., Eyewitness Identification: “I Notice You Paused on Number 
Three,” 20 CHAMPION 10, 11 (1996). 
161 Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: 
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 817 (1995) (suggesting that 
eyewitness’ confidence is “a dubious indicator” of eyewitness accuracy.) 
162 See generally Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 489 (2007). 
163 As Justice Elena Kagan put it, new research “should lead us all to wonder about the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10–8974), available at http://www.supremecourt. 
gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-8974.pdf; Adam Liptak, Often Wrong but 
Rarely in Doubt: Eyewitness IDs Will Get a Fresh Look, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A14 
(“[T]here is no area in which social science research has done more to illuminate a legal issue. 
More than 2,000 studies on the topic have been published in professional journals in the past 
30 years.”).  
164 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012). 
165  Dahlia Lithwick, See No Evil, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2011/11/perry_v_new_ hampshire_the_ 
supreme_court_looks_at_eyewitness_evid.html.  
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the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification is not 
obtained under “unnecessarily suggestive” circumstances created by law 
enforcement.166 
In Perry, the defendant was convicted of unauthorized removal of 
private property.167 The police questioned a witness who had called the police 
to check on a “tall black man” allegedly breaking into cars in her apartment 
building’s parking lot in the early morning hours.168 She then went to the 
kitchen window of her apartment, looked out, and identified a suspect in the 
parking lot—the only black person standing next to a police officer who had 
come to investigate.169 About a month later, that witness could not pick out 
the same person from a photo array.170 
 At trial, the witness was permitted to testify to her out-of-court 
identification of the defendant over defense counsel’s objection that the 
identification at the scene was the result of the suggestive circumstances.171 
In rejecting the defendant’s due process challenge, the Supreme Court 
explained that the purpose of the Court’s precedents going back to 1967 was 
to deter police from arranging identifications that were so suggestive that the 
witness had no option but to pick out the suspect on which the police were 
focusing.172 In Perry, the Court found that such deterrence was not at issue 
because the police had not arranged the identification in a suggestive way.173 
Despite a nod to “the importance [and] fallibility of eyewitness 
identification,”174 the Court made no attempt to discuss the relevance of the 
Manson analysis or indicate any willingness to revisit it. The Court did, 
however, recognize the role of state courts in addressing and weighing 
eyewitness evidence.175  




166 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728. 
167 Id. at 722. 
168 Id. at 721. 
169 Id. at 722. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 724. 
173 Id. at 728. 
174 Id. at 727. 
175 Id. at 729 (“State and federal rules of evidence, moreover, permit trial judges to exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact or 
potential for misleading the jury.”) (citations omitted). 
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C. RULINGS BY STATE COURTS ARE BEGINNING TO FORCE THE LAW 
TO CATCH UP WITH THE SCIENCE ON EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATIONS 
Before addressing in-court identifications specifically, it is important to 
point out that, even prior to the groundbreaking state supreme court rulings 
in New Jersey in 2011 and Oregon in 2012, a handful of other state courts 
had rejected, departed from, or made adjustments to the Manson analysis in 
an attempt to bring their tests for determining the reliability of identification 
evidence more in line with scientific research. Each of these states has come 
up with its own way of trying to distinguish a reliable identification from an 
unreliable identification, although all of them agree that a pure Manson 
analysis is insufficient. 
For example, Massachusetts flatly rejected Manson and, instead, held 
tightly to the rule from Wade/Gilbert/Stovall, requiring per se exclusion of 
unnecessarily suggestive identifications while permitting subsequent 
identifications if based on an independent source. 176  In 1995, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the Manson “‘reliability 
test’ is unacceptable because it provides little or no protection from 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, from mistaken 
identifications and, ultimately, from wrongful convictions.”177 Although the 
Manson Court “discussed the public interest in deterring police from using 
identification procedures which are unnecessarily suggestive,” the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that, in fact, “the reliability test 
does little or nothing” to accomplish this goal.178 Instead, “the show-up has 
flourished” under Manson and “[a]lmost any suggestive lineup will still meet 
reliability standards.”179 The Massachusetts court refused the prosecution’s 
invitation to abandon the per se exclusionary rule, which, it believed, is the 
only option to “ensure the continued protection against the danger of 
mistaken identification and wrongful convictions.”180 
 
176 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Mass. 1995) (“The [Manson] 
reliability test hinders, rather than aids, the fair and just administration of justice by permitting 
largely unreliable evidence to be admitted directly on the issue of the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.”). Note that as discussed in the Introduction above and below in Part IV, in 2014, 
Massachusetts convened a special committee to study the science and law regarding 
eyewitness identification and recommended numerous changes to the law, including taking 
judicial notice of the 30 years of science reviewed and accepted by the Henderson and Lawson 
courts. See supra note 35.  
177 Id. at 1262. 
178 Id. at 1262–63. 
179 Id. at 1263. 
180 Id. at 1265. 
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Other states have raised concerns about the federal standard for 
eyewitness evidence. Even before Massachusetts rejected the federal 
reliability test, the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that additional 
protections above the federal standard were required under its state 
constitution.181 In addition, the New York court condemned the use of a 
show-up at the police station when the suspects were viewed in custody, 
which the court dubbed the “ideal of suggestibility.”182 And the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, in 2005, adopted a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessary 
show-up identifications.183 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the Biggers/Manson 
factors fail primarily because they were created by lawyers and judges rather 
than those with a real working knowledge of the human mind—the 
scientists. 184  The Utah court observed that, “courts and lawyers tend to 
‘ignore the teachings of other disciplines, especially when they contradict 
long-accepted legal notions,’” leading to a “lag between the assumptions 
embodied in the law and the findings of other disciplines[.]”185 The Utah 
court attempted to bring the law more in line with science by changing the 
factors to be considered. 186  The factor tests in whatever form, however, 
continue to mistakenly focus on self-reported information from a witness 
who firmly believes in his or her own memory and is unaware of how outside 
factors may have impacted that memory. 
 
181 People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981). 
182 Id. at 383 (“Long before the Supreme Court entered the field this court expressed 
concern for, and devised evidentiary rules to minimize the risk of misidentification. After the 
Supreme Court condemned the practice of police arranged showups and established minimum 
standards for pretrial identifications this court found that additional protections were needed 
under the State Constitution.”) (citations omitted). 
183 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593–94 (Wis. 2005) (“We conclude that evidence 
obtained from an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible 
unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary. A showup will 
not be necessary, however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a 
result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo array.”).  
184 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991). 
185 Id. (citation omitted). 
186 Id. at 781 (citing the relevant factors as: “(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view 
the actor during the event; (2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the 
event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in 
the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor 
was the same as the observer’s”) (citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
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The per se exclusionary rule has historically been the driving force 
behind progress toward deterring unnecessarily suggestive eyewitness 
identifications. According to Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson, “[o]ver 
time, a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive identification 
practices tends to create, through a case-by-case method, a set of best 
practices,” which leads to further rulings defining suggestive procedures.187 
States are beginning to implement best practices as a result. For example, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Connecticut, as well as the cities of Dallas, 
Minneapolis, Boston, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Tucson, 
Denver, and Northampton, have implemented more reliable procedures for 
lineups.188 And in Georgia, Oregon, Virginia, Texas, Wisconsin, and Rhode 
Island, law enforcement trainings have recommended or promulgated 
voluntary guidelines for more reliable lineups.189 More recently, in 2013, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police called for changes in conducting 
investigations, including modifying eyewitness identification procedures.190 
As the number of cities and states instituting more stringent 
requirements for pretrial identifications grows, police and prosecutors will 
inevitably opt for first time, in-court identifications when the witness gives 
only a general description after the crime, like the witnesses in Hickman.191 
Accordingly, prosecutors may choose to forego the stringent pretrial 
identification procedures altogether, and, instead, take advantage of the in-
court identification where the witness will see the defendant seated at the 
defense table having been charged with the crime. In order to prevent a shift 
toward this less reliable procedure in the wake of increasingly stringent state 
standards for the admissibility of eyewitness testimony subjected to a pretrial 
procedure, a per se exclusionary approach to first time, in-court 
identifications is needed. This approach should encourage the use of reliable 
out-of-court procedures, pretrial or with leave during trial. 
 
187 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians 
Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 614–15 (2010). 
188 Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCEPROJECT.ORG, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Eyewitness_Identification_Reform.php (last accessed on Oct. 9, 2014).  
189 Id. 
190 Spencer S. Hsu, Police Chiefs Lead Effort to Prevent Wrongful Convictions by Altering 
Investigative Practices, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/crime/police-chiefs-urge-changes-to-photo-lineups-other-tools-to-prevent-wrong
ful-convictions/2013/12/02/5d8e9af2-5b69-11e3-bf7e-f567ee61ae21_story.html; see Int’l 
Chiefs of Police, Model Policy: Showups, Photographic Identifications, and Lineups  
(Jun. 2006), http://dpa.ky.gov/nr/rdonlyres/be390c82-e7dd-4a1e-8a3a-4702c5110cd1/0/ 
internationalassocofchiefsofpolice.pdf.  
191 See discussion, supra note 18. 
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IV. APPLYING THE SCIENCE TO FIRST TIME IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS  
A. COURTS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED FIRST TIME, IN-COURT 
IDENTIFICATIONS IN THE PAST DID NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF 
RECENT SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FAILED TO 
UNDERSTAND THE SCOPE OF THE SUGGESTION 
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed a claim of 
suggestiveness resulting from a first time, in-court identification. Lower 
federal and state courts have taken different approaches as to how such claims 
should be analyzed.192 The Oregon Supreme Court was the first court to 
tackle the issue in a jurisdiction that accepts the advances in eyewitness 
science discussed above, but, unfortunately, fell back on the mistaken 
analysis applied in past cases, all of which were decided without the benefit 
of the science.193 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in its recent decision in 
Crayton, was the first state supreme court to exclude a first time, in-court 
identification. The court did so by analogizing the identification to a “show-
up,” which was already deemed “unnecessarily suggestive” under 
Massachusetts law.194 The Crayton court, therefore, did not discuss in detail 
the additional scientific bases for finding a first time, in-court identification 
unreliable.195 Other courts around the country, however, do not have the 
 
192 See United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1992) (adopting Biggers totality of 
circumstances test to first time, in-court identifications); United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 
425 (8th Cir. 1988) (adopting a two-step test under Biggers totality of circumstances test to 
determine the admissibility of in-court identification); United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 
938 (2d Cir. 1984) (deciding that in-court identification was impermissibly suggestive where 
defendant was the only black person in the courtroom and was seated next to defense counsel). 
The Supreme Court, however, has not decided whether Manson applies to first time, in-court 
identifications. See, e.g., United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The 
Supreme Court has not extended its exclusionary rule to in-court identification procedures that 
are suggestive because of the trial setting.”).  
193 See discussion, supra note 22. 
194 Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Mass. 2014) (citing Commonwealth 
v. Phillips, 897 N.E.2d 31, 42 (Mass. 2008)); Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560–
61 (Mass. 2006).  
195 Crayton, 21 N.E.3d at 166. The court also held that a first time, in-court identification 
may be admissible where there is “good reason.” Id. at 170–72. “Good reason” may exist, the 
court held, where the eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the commission of 
the crime, such as in domestic violence cases. Id. at 160. “Good reason” may also exist the 
witness is an arresting officer who was also a witness to the commission of the crime and who 
is testifying that the defendant is, in fact, the person who was arrested for the crime. Id. In both 
circumstances, the Crayton court recognized, “the in-court showup is understood by the jury 
as confirmation that the defendant sitting in the court room is the person whose conduct is at 
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benefit of such established precedent or an understanding of the science.  
Before Crayton, the majority of courts had concluded that the 
suggestion does not arise in the first place because “the judge is present and 
can adequately address relevant problems; the jury is physically present to 
witness the identification, rather than merely hearing testimony about it; and 
cross-examination offers defendants an adequate safeguard or remedy against 
suggestive examinations.” 196  Some courts have held that, although 
suggestive, first time, in-court identifications are nonetheless reliable under 
the Biggers factors and a totality of the circumstances test.197 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Domina, discussed at length the 
suggestiveness inherent in first time, in-court identifications, but still refused 
to institute a rule requiring a non-suggestive identification.198 As the court 
explained, “When the witness is asked [for the first time in court] if he or she 
can identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, this is surely 
equivalent to the ‘show-up’ pretrial situation. Only slightly less suggestive is 
the procedure whereby the witness is asked if he or she can identify the 
perpetrator of the crime from among those present in the courtroom when the 
defendant is sitting at the defense counsel table.”199 The court went on to 
describe the problem: “When asked to point to the robber, an identification 
witness—particularly if he has some familiarity with courtroom 
 
issue rather than as identification evidence.” Id. Because the “good reason” exception is 
reserved for contexts outside of a pure stranger identification, we do not discuss it here. 
196 State v. Lewis, 609 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2005); see also United States v. Bush, 749 
F.2d 1227, 1231 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[D]eference shown the jury in weighing the reliability of 
potentially suggestive out-of-court identification would seem even more appropriate for 
in-court identifications where the jury is present and able to see first-hand the circumstances 
which may influence a witness[.]”); Byrd v. State, 25 A.3d 761, 767 (Del. 2011) (citing Bush, 
749 F.2d 1227); People v. Medina, 208 A.D.2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); People v. 
Medina, 617 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“[W]here there has not been a pretrial 
identification and defendant is identified in court for first time, defendant is not deprived of 
fair trial because defendant is able to explore weaknesses and suggestiveness of identification 
in front of the jury[.]”); State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1986) (“The defendant’s 
protection against the obvious suggestiveness in any courtroom identification confrontation is 
his right to cross-examination.”); People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill. App. 3d 582, 589 (1985) 
(“Where a witness first identifies the defendant at trial, defense counsel may test perceptions, 
memory, and bias of the witness, contemporaneously exposing weaknesses and adding 
perspective to lessen hazards of undue weight or mistake.”); Ralston v. State, 309 S.E.2d 135, 
136 (Ga. 1983). 
197 See, e.g., Rundell, 858 F.2d at 426; Hill, 967 F.2d at 232; Code v. Montgomery, 725 
F.2d 1316, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 1984). 
198 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986). 
199 Id. at 1368 (citing United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 941–42, modified, 756 
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
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procedures—is quite likely to look immediately at the counsel table, where 
the defendant is conspicuously seated in relative isolation. Thus the usual 
physical setting of a trial may itself provide a suggestive setting for an eye-
witness identification.”200 The court, nonetheless, shied away from the issue 
because it believed that “[t]here is no constitutional entitlement to an in-court 
lineup or other particular methods of lessening the suggestiveness of in-court 
identification, such as seating the defendant elsewhere in the room.”201 
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Archibald, took a step in the 
right direction and its decision, according to Professor Evan Mandery, 
“represents the high-water mark of protection afforded to suggestive in-court 
identifications.”202 There, the defendant in a robbery case argued “that the in-
court identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive circumstances, 
namely, that throughout the trial he was the only black person in the 
courtroom, except for one day when a black United States Marshal was 
present, and that he was seated at the defense table.”203 At trial, the defendant 
requested a corporeal lineup and asked “to be seated with five or six other 
black men who looked reasonably like him, to ensure that he would not be 
obviously singled out by an educated witness.”204 The trial court denied his 
request as “inappropriate” and allowed the in-court identification. On appeal, 
the Second Circuit hit the nail on the head:  
As is generally the case, the defendant here was seated next to defense counsel during 
the trial, a circumstance obviously suggestive to witnesses asked to make in-court 
identifications. Any witness, especially one who has watched trials on television, can 
determine which of the individuals in the courtroom is the defendant, which is the 
defense lawyer, and which is the prosecutor.205  
The appellate court held that while “there was no obligation to stage a 
lineup, . . . there was, however, an obligation to ensure that the in-court 
procedure here did not simply amount to a ‘show-up.’”206 The court also 
insightfully acknowledged the relative ease with which the prejudice could 
have been prevented: “A fairly short delay of proceedings was all that would 
have been required to rearrange the seating in the courtroom and to secure 
the presence of some people of the defendant’s approximate age and skin 
 
200 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
201 Id. at 1369. 
202 See Mandery, supra note 7, at 402. 
203 Archibald, 734 F.2d at 940. 
204 Id. at 941. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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color.”207 
The Second Circuit ultimately ruled that the error in admitting the in-
court identifications was harmless in light of other evidence to support the 
conviction.208 While the court recognized the inherent suggestiveness of the 
identification, the holding ultimately disregards the powerful effect that 
identification evidence has on the jury, which is the reason courts should 
institute a per se exclusionary approach and require an out-of-court lineup or 
other non-suggestive procedures. 
B. THE SCIENCE APPLIES TO FIRST TIME, IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS 
JUST AS IT DOES TO PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATIONS, AND REQUIRES 
THE SAME PROTECTIONS AGAINST MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION 
EVIDENCE 
Just this past year, in Oregon—a jurisdiction that has accepted and 
altered its approach to admitting eyewitness identification testimony based 
on the significant body of scientific research about human memory and its 
impact on eyewitness identification—the state Supreme Court was presented 
with a prime opportunity to institute a per se exclusionary approach to first 
time, in-court identifications in Hickman, but refused to do so.209 Advocates 
for enhanced safeguards against eyewitness misidentification had high hopes 
for Hickman because the facts so strongly cautioned against the admissibility 
of the first time, in-court identifications. One witness (D) told police on the 
night of the shooting that she did not see the perpetrator. 210  Yet D was 
permitted to testify at trial that she was 95 percent certain the shooter was the 
defendant sitting before her.211 The other witness (N) gave only a vague 
description of a stocky black male in his mid-twenties on the night of the 
shooting.212 She, too, was allowed to testify at trial that the shooter was 
 
207 Id. at 942.  
208 Id. at 943. 
209 State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551 (Or. 2014). We use the Hickman case as an example 
because it is the first case that addresses first time, in-court stranger identifications in a 
jurisdiction that has accepted the recent advances in social science on human memory and its 
impact on identifications. The authors of this article, through the Oregon Innocence Project, 
submitted an amicus brief on this issue to the Oregon Supreme Court in Hickman, urging the 
Court to adopt a bright line rule prohibiting first time, in-court stranger identifications. Brief 
of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network and Oregon Innocence Project in Support of 
Respondent, State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551 (Or. 2014), (No. 081235225), 2014 WL 1227589, 
at *19.  
210 Id. at 568. 
211 Id. at 556. 
212 Id. 
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Hickman, the black twenty-something male sitting before her.213 
The Hickman court started from the faulty premise that memory 
contamination will manifest itself in a way that is self-evident to the jury.214 
The court refused to recognize that suggestiveness inside the courtroom may 
irreparably contaminate a witness’s mind to form an unreliable “memory” of 
the incident, which may be mistaken yet convincing to a jury. Instead, the 
Hickman court relied heavily on the misguided notion that the jury can assess 
the credibility of a first time, in-court identification because the jury can 
observe the witness’s demeanor, including facial expressions, voice 
inflection, and body language, during the identification process. 215  The 
Hickman court failed to recognize that a witness’s demeanor can only tell us 
how certain the witness is in her or his own mind. As science has proved time 
and time again, certainty does not equal reliability. 216  Rather, “most 
eyewitnesses think they are telling the truth even when their testimony is 
inaccurate, and ‘[b]ecause the eyewitness is testifying honestly (i.e., 
sincerely), he or she will not display the demeanor of the dishonest or biased 
witness.’”217 Indeed, even some mistaken eyewitnesses will “exude supreme 
confidence in their identifications.”218 
Hickman is especially disappointing in light of earlier decisions in State 
v. Henderson,219 from the New Jersey Supreme Court, and State v. Lawson,220 
from the Oregon Supreme Court—two landmark cases leading the way for 
the application of social science to eyewitness identification evidence.221 
Both Henderson and Lawson embrace the idea of assessing the reliability of 
identification evidence based on advances in science that have dramatically 
improved our understanding of the way in which the mind works.222 That 
 
213 Id. at 562. 
214 Id. at 569. 
215 Id. at 564. 
216 See supra Section II.C. 
217 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 889 (N.J. 2011) (quoting Epstein, supra note 44, at 
772).  
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 894. 
220 291 P.3d 673, 685 (Or. 2012). 
221 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s “Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence” 
also recommended analyzing eyewitness identification evidence using the new advances in 
memory science to determine admissibility and create a heightened gatekeeping function for 
trial courts. See supra note 35, at 12–13. The Massachusetts court showed a willingness to put 
some teeth behind that gatekeeping function when it excluded the first time, in-court 
identification in Crayton. Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169 (Mass. 2014). 
222 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 894; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684. 
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body of scientific evidence from which Henderson and Lawson emerged 
points to the fallibility of human memory, the inability of the average juror 
to distinguish credibility from confidence, and the frequency with which 
laypeople hold beliefs contrary to the weight of scientific evidence.223 The 
fact that Hickman came out of a jurisdiction that accepts this science-based 
analysis is troubling—the court should have embraced the same concerns. 
The scientific research adopted in Henderson and Lawson is organized 
by system variables, those factors within the control of those administrating 
an identification procedure, and estimator variables, those factors that are 
beyond the control of the criminal justice system that are “equally capable of 
affecting an eyewitness’ ability to perceive and remember an event.”224 Using 
this framework to create a more informed understanding of the human 
memory, the Henderson and Lawson courts rejected the Manson test as 
inadequate. 225  Henderson specifically recognized that the Manson test 
“overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by 
eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is accurate.”226 Courts, 
like Hickman, that continue to rely on the jury to ferret out unreliable 
identification evidence have failed to fully grasp the science that should 
inform these decisions. 
Memory contamination does not appear on the witness’s face like a 
“tell” in poker.227 Thus, Henderson and Lawson hold that the court, rather 
than the jury, must assess the reliability of identification evidence using 
certain guideposts for admissibility.228 Although the courts in those cases 
focused on suggestiveness resulting from pretrial identification procedures, 
the concerns underlying those procedures are unmistakable in first time, in-
court identifications. The same concerns that compelled the Henderson and 
Lawson courts to re-examine the standard for the admissibility of pretrial 
identifications should compel courts to re-examine the admissibility of first 
time, in-court identifications. We discuss several of these concerns in turn. 
Targeted Suspect: Courts around the country recognize the inherent 
danger of an identification procedure in which the witness is aware of whom 
police officers have targeted as a suspect.229 With that danger in mind, many 
 
223 See supra Part II. 
224 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904; see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684. 
225 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 889–92; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684. 
226 Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878. 
227 See supra Section II.C. 
228 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 690. 
229 See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 183 (N.J. 2006) (“[O]ne-on-one showups are 
inherently suggestive . . . because the victim can only choose from one person.” (internal 
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courts, including Henderson and Lawson, have uniformly denounced the 
“show-up” as “inherently suggestive.”230 Identification procedures involving 
a single suspect fail to “provide a safeguard against witnesses with poor 
memories or those inclined to guess, because every mistaken identification 
in a showup will point to the suspect.”231 A number of states have limited the 
admissibility of show-ups.232 The same construct, however, exists in first 
time, in-court identifications, which have yet to be ruled inadmissible—the 
sole exception being the recent (2014) state supreme court ruling in 
Massachusetts.233  In a first time, in-court identification, the witness is acutely 
aware that the individual seated at the defense table has been targeted by the 
police and the state as the perpetrator. A fact that cannot be ignored is that 
the state believes so strongly in that individual’s guilt that he or she has been 
called to trial. The first time, in-court identification presents the ultimate 
“targeted suspect” situation that courts have repeatedly condemned in the 
pretrial context. 
Expectancy Effect: Psychologists define the “expectancy effect” as “the 
tendency for experimenters to obtain results they expect . . . because they 
have helped to shape that response.”234 The Henderson and Lawson courts 
focused on the expectancy effect in lineups and found that even with the best 
of intentions, an administrator with knowledge of the suspect’s identity may 
inadvertently sway the witness through language and subtle cues, including 
“pauses, gestures, hesitations, or smiles.” 235  Studies show “that both 
witnesses and administrators are generally unconscious of the influence that 
the lineup administrator’s behavior has on identification process.” 236 
Henderson and Lawson, therefore, recommended double-blind lineup 
procedures where the administrator “is not investigating the particular case 
 
citation omitted)); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582–84 (Wis. 2005) (“[E]vidence obtained 
from an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless . . . the 
procedure was necessary.”); People v. Riley, 517 N.E.2d 520, 524 (N.Y. 1987) (“Showup 
identifications, by their nature suggestive, are strongly disfavored but are permissible if 
exigent circumstances require immediate identification[.]” (internal citation omitted)). 
230 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 902–03; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 686. 
231 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 903. 
232 Id. (citing cases limiting the admissibility of show-ups). 
233 Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169 (Mass. 2014). 
234 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896 (citing Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Interpersonal 
Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 377, 377 (1978)). 
235 Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685–86. 
236 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 706 (citing Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of 
Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 1106, 1110 (2004)). 
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and does not know who the suspect is.”237 At a minimum, the courts urge a 
blind lineup where the administrator may know who the suspect is, but does 
not know where he or she is located in the lineup or photo array.238 
There is no chance for a non-blind procedure in a first time, in-court 
identification. The prosecutor, the witness, and everyone else in the 
courtroom are aware that the suspect is the individual seated at the defense 
table. There is no way to safeguard the witness from influence caused by 
subtle cues in the prosecutor’s questioning or not-so-subtle cues in the 
courtroom itself. The expectation that the witness identify the defendant is 
palpable and may have a powerful effect on the reliability of an identification. 
Lucky Guesses: “Properly constructed lineups test a witness’ memory 
and decrease the chance that a witness is simply guessing.”239 Henderson and 
Lawson, therefore, discussed at length the need for identification procedures, 
like lineups, that include look-alike “fillers.”240 “The reason is simple: an 
array of look-alikes forces witnesses to examine their memory.” 241  Both 
courts recognized that “if for any reason a suspect disproportionately stands 
out from the lineup fillers surrounding him or her, then the identification 
procedure is suggestive—and the reliability of any resulting identification 
decreases correspondingly.”242 The suggestion is obvious with a first time, 
in-court identification. The suspect stands out in the courtroom, sitting at the 
defense table in near isolation, and there are no look-alikes surrounding him 
or her to test the eyewitness’s memory. The witness is not asked to examine 
her memory and, instead, is expected to simply point at the defendant who 
the state has already identified as the perpetrator. The “guess” is not only 
lucky, it is inevitable. 
Further, because the defendant stands out behind the defense table, 
similar to a pretrial procedure where the suspect clearly stands out from the 
rest, a witness may experience increased “confidence in the identification 
because the selection process seemed easy.” 243  The inflated sense of 
confidence has a powerful effect on the jury, thereby undermining the jury’s 
 
237 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 897; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 706. 
238 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 897 (suggesting a procedure known as the “envelope method,” 
where a single-blind administrator “who knows the suspect’s identity places [photos] into 
different envelopes, shuffles them, and presents them to the witness” without “looking at the 
envelopes or pictures while the witness makes an identification”). 
239 Id.  
240 Id. at 887; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 706–07. 
241 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898. 
242 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 707. 
243 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898 (internal citation omitted). 
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ability to effectively weigh the credibility of the identification.244 
Relative Judgment: “Relative judgment refers to the fact that the 
witness seems to be choosing the lineup member who most resembles the 
witnesses’ memory relative to other lineup members.”245 Studies prove that 
“if the actual perpetrator is not in a lineup, people may be inclined to choose 
the best look-alike.”246 In fact, “field experiments suggest that when the true 
perpetrator is not in the lineup, eyewitnesses may nonetheless select an 
innocent suspect more than one-third of the time.” 247  The courts in 
Henderson and Lawson advocate for pre-lineup instructions to reduce the 
possibility of the relative judgment phenomenon.248 That is, studies conclude 
“that the likelihood of misidentification is significantly decreased when 
witnesses are instructed prior to an identification procedure that a suspect 
may or may not be in the lineup or photo array, and that it is permissible not 
to identify anyone.” 249  Implicit in this conclusion, however, is that the 
witness must actually believe that the premise of the instruction is true—that 
the perpetrator may, in fact, be absent from the lineup. With a first time, in-
court identification, this premise is hardly plausible, as the witness knows 
that the state firmly believes that the perpetrator is sitting at the defense table. 
Telling a witness that the perpetrator may or may not be in the courtroom is 
a glaring pretense. Relative judgment is likely to influence the identification 
when the witness knows that the state believes the individual at the defense 
table to be guilty. 
Suggestive Feedback: Feedback from police or prosecutors after an 
identification “affects the reliability of an identification in that it can distort 
memory, create a false sense of confidence, and alter a witness’s report of 
how he or she viewed an event.”250 For example, “those who receive a simple 
post-identification confirmation regarding the accuracy of their identification 
significantly inflate their reports to suggest better witnessing conditions at 
the time of the crime, stronger memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper 
 
244 Id. at 889 (“[W]e are mindful of the observation that ‘there is almost nothing more 
convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the 
defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’” (citing Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1979) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
245 Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
89, 92 (1984) (citation omitted).  
246 Id. (citation omitted). 
247 Id. at 887–88 (emphasis added). 
248 Id. at 897; State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 706 (N.J. 2012). 
249 Id.  
250 Id. at 900. 
6. KAPLAN FINAL TO PRINTER (UPDATED 12.8.2016)        12/8/2016 2:18 PM 
2015] RELIABILITY OF FIRST TIME IN-COURT IDS 987 
memory abilities in general.”251 In others words, confirming feedback in the 
courtroom can bolster the witness’s confidence that he or she has selected the 
“right” person. The Lawson court agreed that “the danger of confirming 
feedback lies in its tendency to increase the appearance of reliability without 
increasing reliability itself.” 252  There is no greater risk of confirming 
feedback than in the trial setting. Once the witness has identified the 
defendant as the perpetrator, the prosecution will continue to ask questions 
designed to elicit details confirming the witness’s certitude. The witness’s 
exclusive role is to answer questions and prove how certain she is. The simple 
act of continuing the questioning tells the witness that he or she was “right,” 
allowing her to respond to cross-examination and other scrutiny with greater 
confidence borne out of the approbation of the figures of authority in the 
courtroom. The witness’s subsequent account of other details surrounding the 
event may become distorted or presented with false confidence, increasing 
the apparent credibility of the identification itself. 
Memory Decay: Memory decay is irreversible and occurs at an 
exponential rather than a linear rate, with the greatest proportion of memory 
loss occurring shortly after the event and the rate of memory loss leveling off 
over time.253 Consequently, the longer the delay between the crime and the 
identification, the greater the likelihood for misidentification. While 
researchers cannot pinpoint the exact moment when a witness’s recall 
becomes unreliable, one of the studies relied upon by the Henderson court 
demonstrates a substantial increase in misidentification from two to twenty-
four hours after an event.254 “Scientists generally agree that memory never 
improves,” and the probative value of an identification conducted after a 
significant event also turns on the quality of the original memory based on 
the other estimator variables.255 An identification that happens for the first 
time in the courtroom will necessarily occur long after the crime itself. The 
state is asking the witness to identify the perpetrator sometimes years after 
the event and under the most suggestive of conditions—when the state has 
already identified the perpetrator and seated him prominently before the 
witness. That witness is highly susceptible to influence. 
The courts in Henderson and Lawson articulated each of these concerns 
 
251 Id. at 899 (quoting Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in 
Eyewitness: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864–65 (2006) (citation omitted)). 
252 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 710.  
253 Id. at 688. 
254 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 907. 
255 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 705 (citing Henderson, 72 A.3d at 907).  
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about influence in identification procedures, but, because the concerns were 
discussed in the context of pretrial identifications under the facts of those 
cases, the court in Hickman chose not to recognize the parallels to first time, 
in-court identifications. 
Many courts, including Hickman, have fallen back on the mistaken (but 
widely held) belief that suggestiveness, if any, can be “cured” for the jury 
through cross-examination, expert testimony, or jury instructions. 256  The 
problem is that the mere recognition of system variables or estimator 
variables does not make a trier of fact any more adept at being able to 
distinguish a reliable identification from an identification contaminated by 
outside forces.257 Scientists agree that “one cannot know for certain which 
identifications are accurate and which are false—which are the product of 
reliable memories and which are distorted by one of a number of factors.”258 
Mistaken eyewitness identifications often stem not from malice, but 
from the witness’s honest belief in the accuracy of his or her own memory. 
Traditional trial tools are ineffective at exposing an honest, but nevertheless 
mistaken, witness. Cross-examination, for example, “will often expose a lie 
or half-truth, but may be far less effective when witnesses, although 
mistaken, believe that what they say is true.”259 Although acting in good faith, 
“eyewitnesses are likely to use their ‘expectations, personal experience, 
biases, and prejudices’ to fill in the gaps created by imperfect memory. 
Because it is unlikely that witnesses will be aware that this process has 
occurred, they may express far more confidence in the identification than is 
warranted.”260 The Crayton court recognized that the jury’s ability to view 
the in-court identification and assess the witness’s confidence does not make 
the jury better able to evaluate the accuracy of the identification because 
 
256 State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 564–65 (Or. 2014). 
257 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 911 (discussing a study that revealed not only that mock jurors 
“were insensitive to the effects of [a suggestive identification procedure, but that they also] 
gave disproportionate weight to the confidence of the witness, [leading scientists to] 
conclude[] that jurors do not evaluate eyewitness memory in a manner consistent with 
psychological theory and findings” (citing Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 186–87 (1990)). 
258 Id. at 888. 
259 State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110 (Utah 2009) (citing Jacqueline McMurtrie, The 
Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 
1277 (2005); Peter J. Cohen, How Shall they be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE. L. REV. 237, 273 (1996)).  
260 Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1110 (citing Steve D. Charman & Gary L. Wells, Can 
Eyewitnesses Correct for External Influences on Their Lineup Identifications? The 
Actual/Counterfactual Assessment Paradigm, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 5, 5 
(2008) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (1986)). 
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confidence does not equate to accuracy.261 Cross-examination is especially 
inadequate to reveal weaknesses when the identification happens for the first 
time in court because the identification was not tested pretrial—without the 
suggestiveness of the in-court procedure—for comparison. 
Jury instructions, too, have also proved ineffective to “cure” the 
prejudice from a mistaken identification. 262  The Henderson and Lawson 
courts recognized that not only are laypersons largely unfamiliar with 
scientific evidence relating to memory and suggestiveness, but also 
individuals often hold beliefs that go against the weight of scientific 
evidence.263 The use of jury instructions to educate the jury on the reliability 
of eyewitness identifications has been shown to have little effect on what 
jurors intuitively believe about memory, with one study relied upon in 
Henderson showing that mock jurors “were insensitive to the effects of 
[estimator variables], retention interval, suggestive lineup instructions, and 
procedures used for constructing and carrying out the lineup,” but 
nevertheless “gave disproportionate weight to the confidence of the 
witness.”264 In fact, experts find that “eyewitness confidence [is] the most 
powerful predictor of verdicts regardless of other variables.”265 
For the same reasons, expert testimony cannot cure the prejudice from 
a suggestive identification. Scientists find that, although experts can inform 
jurors about the factors that may make an identification particularly 
unreliable, experts cannot help the jury determine whether any particular 
identification is accurate or not.266 A first time, in-court identification is, 
therefore, subject to many of the concerns condemned in pretrial 
identifications because of the tendency to create suggestiveness in the 
encounter, which cannot be cured by traditional trial techniques. A few rare 
courts have recognized that the setting of the courtroom is inherently 
 
261 Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Mass. 2014) (citing Supreme Judicial 
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence: Report and Recommendations to the Justices 19 
(July 25, 2013)). 
262 Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1110 (citing Cohen, supra note 259, at 272 (1996); BRIAN L. 
CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY 
AND THE LAW 264 (1995); Edith Greene, Eyewitness Testimony and the Use of Cautionary 
Instructions, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 15, 20 (1987)).  
263 State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 703 (N.J. 2012); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 910 
(N.J. 2011). 
264 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 911 (citations omitted). 
265 Id. (citation omitted).  
266 Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271, 286 (2007). 
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suggestive and encouraged the permissive grant of a pretrial lineup.267 Many, 
however, have explicitly stated that a pretrial lineup procedure is not a 
prerequisite to every in-court identification.268 
Absent a way to cure the suggestiveness of a first time, in-court 
identification, courts should encourage out-of-court identification procedures 
either pretrial or with leave during trial by prohibiting the first time, in-court 
identification. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts must either accept the science or not. It is disingenuous to accept 
the science when it comes to analyzing pretrial identifications, while refusing 
to accept that the same science informs in-court identifications. 
For those courts that accept the science proving our memories are 
exceptionally malleable, the suggestion arising inside the courtroom must be 
recognized and guarded against. The same concerns courts have articulated 
in the pretrial context exist in the context of first time, in-court identifications. 
As courts begin to create more reliable pretrial procedures, the courts must 
also encourage the use of those procedures by prohibiting first time, in-court 
identifications, which circumvent all of the precautionary measures designed 
to prevent misidentifications, such as blind administration, lineups that 
include look-alike fillers, pre-identification instructions, and non-suggestive 
questioning. The first time, in-court identification, instead, has all the 
suggestiveness of a show-up and should be similarly banned. 
We propose that courts require prosecutors to disclose witnesses who 
may be asked to identify the defendant during trial and prohibit the question 
from being asked of those who have not made a pretrial identification. 
Prosecutors can avoid witness disqualification with relative ease by 
attempting a pretrial identification. For the rare situation in which logistics 
or timing prevent a pretrial identification, courts should permit prosecutors 
to take leave of trial to attempt a non-suggestive, out-of-court identification. 
At a minimum, courts should replicate non-suggestive procedures by 
arranging a reliable lineup inside the courtroom and preventing the witness 
 
267 See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 941–42 (2d Cir. 1984); Commonwealth v. Sexton, 400 A.2d 1289, 
1293 (Pa. 1979) (“It is important to note the limitations of our holding today. First, we have 
declined to accept a per se rule that all in-court confrontations are inadmissible. Second, we 
have also declined to accept a per se rule that a pre-trial, pre-hearing lineup is mandatory in 
all cases. We are merely saying that where as here the issue of identification is legitimately at 
issue, a timely request for a pre-trial or pre-hearing identification procedure should be 
granted.”). 
268 Pitts v. State, 747 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. 2013)  
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from seeing the defendant beforehand. 
Preventing misidentifications that lead to wrongful convictions far 
outweighs the minimal inconvenience to the process and should be, always, 
our priority. 
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